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Abstract—Credential fraud is a widespread practice that
undermines investment and confidence in higher education
systems and bears significant economic and social costs. Legacy
credential verification systems are typically time-consuming,
costly, and bureaucratic, and struggle against certain classes of
credential fraud. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive
blockchain-based credential verification solution, Cerberus,
which is considerably more efficient, easy and intuitive to
use, and effectively mitigates widespread manifestations of
credential fraud. Cerberus also improves significantly upon
other blockchain-based solutions in the research literature: it
adheres closely to the existing credential verification ecosystem,
it addresses a threat model informed by real-world fraud
scenarios. Moreover, Cerberus uses on-chain smart contracts
for credential revocation, and it does not entail students
or employers to manage digital identities or cryptographic
credentials to use the system. We prototype our solution and
describe our attempt to design an online verification service with
a rich feature set, including data privacy, transcript verification,
and selective disclosure of data. We hope this effort contributes
positively to towards alleviating the problem of fake credentials.
Managerial Relevance Statement
There is widespread recognition that the blockchain can effec-
tively combat the problem of fake credentials and significantly
improve the credential verification process. There are several
efforts underway in this domain, both in industry and ideas
proposed in the research literature. However, to the best of our
knowledge, what is most lacking is a rigorous effort to tailor
these solutions to existing practices of credential fraud, and to
mitigate usability issues on the part of users.
Our system will enable practitioners (universities, accredita-
tion bodies, employers) to undertake the following: 1) to con-
cretely visualize the workings and benefits of such a system and
work towards integrating it into existing credential verification
ecosystems, and 2) to adapt and customize the rich feature set
of our solution to cater to their own requirements.
I. Introduction
The value of education to society cannot be overstated: ed-
ucation plays a pivotal role in enabling social mobility [1] [2],
it contributes to economic uplift [3] [4] [5], and it promotes
political stability and reform [6] [7] [8]. Education is also a
critical factor for innovation to meet local and international
challenges and opportunities [9]. For these reasons, education
typically ranks near the top of government spending priorities
in developed countries, and often absorbs over a fifth of total
government spending in the public sector [10].
Corruption in the domain of education can have wide-
ranging and detrimental effects. In 2013, in its global cor-
ruption report on education, Transparency International ex-
tensively documented various instances of such phenomena,
particularly in developing countries where such fraud is per-
vasive and systemic. Corrupt practices range over a wide
spectrum including bribery and nepotism in admissions and
in examinations results, a culture of teacher absenteeism,
deteriorating quality of education, misappropriation of funds,
ghost schools existing only on paper, diploma mills which
issue fake academic degrees, and compromised accreditation
services [11].
In this paper, we specifically focus on the problem of
fake academic credentials. With increasing social pressure to
outperform peers in highly competitive job markets, many
applicants misrepresent their qualifications to make their cur-
riculum vitae more appealing to employers. An academic
credential typically requires considerable investment in terms
of time, effort, and funding, and in turn it confers a certain
prestige on the bearer and opens new opportunities to them.
Fake degrees essentially enable third parties a ‘free ride’ on
these benefits [12].
Falsified credentials range from high school diplomas to
doctorate degrees. There have been publicized instances where
investigators have successfully procured fake degrees on behalf
of pet cats [13] and dogs [14]. According to one study,
over a third of potential candidates admit to falsifying or
‘enhancing’ their qualifications for a job application [15].
A professor in South Africa was recently assassinated for
exposing a syndicate producing fake PhD degrees [16]. There
is a marked scarcity of research on the scope of this problem,
but a conservative estimate suggests that there are more than
5000 unrecognized universities and diploma mills operating
worldwide, and issuing over 200,000 fake degrees annually
with revenues in excess of $1 billion [17].
These unethical practices not only discourage individual
investment in education but also damage the value, credibility
and reputation of a higher education system. Moreover, there
may be considerable social harm: apart from a compromised
sense of ethics, a fake degree holder will likely not possess
the requisite expertise in his field (achieved through rigorous
training and evaluation), thereby posing a real danger in certain
domains. For instance, subjects implicated in fake degree
scandals include doctors, nurses [18] [19] , pilots [20] [21],
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2and even politicians and government ministers [22] [23] [24].
The traditional defense against fake credentials is stringent
verification procedures. In certain countries, this task is un-
dertaken at a national level by government bodies, such as
the Academic Degrees and Graduate Education Development
Center in China [25], the Higher Education Commission in
Pakistan [26], and the Higher Attestation Commission in
Russia [27]. In some territories, accreditation is overseen by
non-governmental agencies, such as the Council for Higher
Education Accreditation (CHEA) in the United States [28], and
Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA)
[29], Australia’s independent national quality assurance and
regulatory agency for higher education. There also exist wide-
ranging international efforts such as the Hague Apostille
Treaty of 1961, whereby citizens can have their credentials cer-
tified by a designated authority so that they may be recognized
in 116 signatory countries [30]. Another facility is the IAU
World Higher Education Database (WHED) which provides
comprehensive information on accredited higher education
systems and credentials around the world [31].
However, most credential verification mechanisms are
opaque, cumbersome, time consuming, and costly. According
to a survey, one in three employers in the UK do not request
candidates for their degree certificates; and, of those who
do, 76% of employers assume the certificates are legitimate
and do not verify their authenticity [32]. Foregoing diligent
background checks entails costs in terms of lost time, perfor-
mance, and investment: in the US, the Department of Labour
reports that forged credentials and doctored qualifications cost
companies an average of $40,000 per bad hire [33].
In recent years, the blockchain has been promoted as a
promising new technology for transparency and data integrity
in a variety of domains, including payment settlements [34]
[35], copyright protection [36] [37], data notarization [38]
[39], digital government [40] [41] [42] [43], health care
[44], [45], [46] [47], logistics and tracking [48] [49], and
secure elections [50] [51]. Due to its distributed architec-
ture and its reliance on cryptography, the blockchain offers
strong guarantees on accountability, accessibility and data
immutability, which is particularly suited to scenarios with
multiple untrusted parties. Various efforts also advocate using
the blockchain to combat the fake degree problem [52] [53]
[54], but as yet there are few rigorous efforts [55] in this
direction.
We attempt to address this deficiency. Our paper makes the
following contributions:
1) We propose a comprehensive blockchain-based solution
for easy and efficient verification of academic creden-
tials. We describe a solution architecture which inte-
grates seamlessly with typical credential management
ecosystems and we devise a threat model informed by
real-world fraud scenarios,
2) We prototype our solution and describe our attempt to
design an online verification service with a rich feature
set, including data privacy, transcript verification, and
selective disclosure of data,
3) We propose a novel credential revocation mechanism.
This is a distinct contribution in its own right. We sug-
gest a simple and practical on-chain revocation mecha-
nism which leverages smart contracts.
We describe here briefly a representative scenario which
motivates our solution: an Accreditation Authority operates
and maintains a permissioned blockchain in partnership with
universities and watchdog organizations. When a student,
Alice, graduates, her university issues her a physical degree
certificate and also add her details on the blockchain platform.
This certificate also contains a QR code which allows Alice, or
any other party, to verify her credentials in real-time from the
blockchain using a smartphone app. This is similar to national
visa verification services such as VEVO in Australia [56], the
Employer Checking Service in the UK [57], and E-Verify in
the US [58], which allow employers to check the visa status
of job applicants via a Web portal. Alice can even paste a QR
code on her resume, thereby enabling prospective employers
to verify her details independent of the certificate. In case
her degree is revoked, the university will make corresponding
entries in the blockchain which will be revealed when Alice’s
QR code is scanned.
This solution has notable differences with prior work: first,
our effort is on engineering a solution that preserves the exist-
ing ecosystem and maintains key security properties such as
guarantees on data privacy, integrity, and revocation. Second,
it approximates and improves upon the real world process flow
for credential management and verification. Furthermore, we
focus on usability: our solution is relatively easy to use since
verification can be done by scanning a QR code and neither
Alice nor her employer are required to personally interact with
the blockchain or maintain secret keys.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section
II Background, we discuss the ground realities regarding aca-
demic credential fraud throughout the world and also discuss
the higher education Ecosystem specific to Pakistan. In Section
III we discuss the architecture and flow of the Proposed
System. In Section IV we enumerate implementation details
of our prototype of the system. In Section V Discussion, we
highlight and explain how our system achieves the various
security properties. In Section VI we compare and contrast our
endeavour with similar systems and related work. In Section
VII we delineate future direction for research and conclude
our discussion in Section VII.
II. Background
A. The Varieties of Credential Fraud
Credential fraud has been around since at least the four-
teenth century [17], and there is considerable evidence that
degrees were widely sold in German universities in the 18th
century [59]. However, this phenomenon gained rapid traction
in the 20th century due to two main drivers: first, as Johnson
convincingly argues, increasing global competition in job mar-
kets has given rise to a widespread culture of credentialism,
with employers ‘overly relying on degrees as proof of job
competency’, even for low-to-moderate skill positions. This
practice likely contributes considerably to the black market
for fake credentials [60].
3Second, the 20th Century marked the ascendance of the
“for-profit” education model in schools and universities,
whereby academic excellence and integrity had to contend in-
creasingly with economic and business interests. This situation
was further complicated by rapid expansion higher education
institutions in the form of distance learning programmes,
flexible and distributed learning modes, branch campuses,
franchising, and credit transfer schemes [61]. The distributed
and transnational nature of these schemes makes it consider-
ably more difficult to enforce independent checks on quality
and integrity.
The result is a pervasive and thriving culture of credential
fraud and a billion dollar industry [11]. Whereas concrete
figures on credential fraud are not available [62], some in-
vestigations reveal the alarming scope of this trend [63]. For
instance, in the US, home to the largest number of diploma
mills in the world [64], Ezell et al. document that the number
of fake PhD degrees purchased every year exceeds 50,000,
outnumbering the 40,000-45,000 legitimate PhDs awarded by
universities [65]. One diploma mill, operated by Americans
with offices in Europe and the Middle East, has sold more than
450,000 degrees with revenues exceeding US $450,000,000.
[66]
In Europe, the UK is believed to host the largest number of
diploma mills [64]. A prominent example was the University
of Wales, the second-largest university in the country with a
120-year history, which had 70,000 students enrolled in 130
colleges around the world. After multiple scams and admin-
istrative failures were uncovered, the registrar resigned and
the university shuttered its highly profitable degree validation
program, which accounted for nearly two thirds of institutional
revenue [67] [68].
Fraud is also rampant in the developing world. According
to one estimate an alarming half of all high school transcripts
in overseas university admissions applications by Chinese stu-
dents are falsified [62]. This problem is also very widespread
in India [69] [70], and trafficking in fake certificates has
been described as a ‘pan-India’ crime [71]. A 2015 study
found that one in nine politicians in the lower house of the
Russian parliament possessed a plagiarized or fake degree. In
Indonesia, a task force was set up by the government in 2015
to crack down on fake degrees issued specifically to politicians
[22].
Here we broadly classify various categories of credential
fraud:
a) Document Fraud: typically involves illegal counter-
feits, deceitful alteration of legitimate credentials (modification
of name, signatures, degree, details, etc.), or complete fabrica-
tions (using fake logos, seals, and serial numbers) [72]. This
category also includes doctored or misleading translations and
evaluations of credentials.
A recent example is the case of degree shops that have
recently sprung up on the Syrian-Turkish border, where mer-
chants exploit desperate Syrian migrants and refugees by
selling them forged documents on their way to Europe. A
high school diploma reportedly costs USD $600, whereas a
university degree can be as much as USD $2,500 [73].
b) Institutional Fraud: refers to the case where staff
within institutions are compromised [67]. Such fraud may
involve the university registrar or other officials who create an
illegitimate credential which is retroactively appended in the
official record of the university. This tactic is more reliable
than document fraud because the credential itself is authentic
and can usually withstand cursory scrutiny because it is backed
by university records.
A prominent example is the case of Busoga University in
Uganda which was investigated in 2016 for issuing more than
1,000 “premium-tuition” degrees to South Sudanese students,
most of them military officers seeking easy degrees to secure
government positions [74].
c) Diploma Mills: sell fake credentials from fictitious
universities and lead the mass market in credential fraud.
These bodies operate in a highly structured and sophisticated
manner, with a corporate culture including a dedicated mar-
keting and sales teams, and offer customised "products" to
buyers. These mills often maintain immaculate websites for
fictitious universities [75].
A recent example is the international scandal of Axact,
widely considered the largest degree scam yet, where a
Pakistan-based company that operated a web of more than 370
diploma mills which collectively earned millions of dollars in
revenue by selling fake degrees and certificates of hundreds
of fictitious universities to clients worldwide [75]. Axact have
also been known to extort their customers for funds after
making sales to them by threatening to reveal that their
credentials were bogus [76].
d) Accreditation Fraud: refers to the case where the
accreditation body that validates a credential as authentic may
itself be compromised or fictitious. A very common strategy
employed by diploma mills is to set up fake accreditation mills
to legitimize the credentials they sell.
The Federal Investigation Agency in Pakistan, has probed
several instances where regulatory bodies verified fake degrees
of powerful officials without due diligence [77]. Recently
a company investigating credentials of Chinese student ap-
plicants on behalf of prominent universities in the US had
to withdraw from the project on charges that it engaged in
widespread application fraud itself [78]. A Connecticut man
who sold fake degrees operated a fictitious accreditation ser-
vice in parallel, the National Distance Learning Accreditation
Council to validate his degrees [79]. These practices pose
highly complex challenges for employers who often have
limited resources available to verify academic credentials.
B. Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Here we present a high-level overview of blockchain and
smart contracts technology and highlight the security proper-
ties of this novel new paradigm.
A blockchain is a decentralized global ledger consisting of a
continuously growing list of records, called blocks, arranged in
chronological order. Users possess cryptographic credentials,
namely a public/private key pair, which enables them to insert
new records into this ledger. Individual blocks are coupled
together using hash pointers such that data cannot be removed
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from the block nor added retroactively without detection by
all the other parties. The synchronization and integrity of this
ledger is assured by a distributed consensus protocol which
periodically selects certain parties (miners) to append new
blocks to the ledger.
The notion of smart contracts builds on this paradigm by
envisioning the shared ledger as a public memory space,
thereby extending the notion of verifiability from data to
computations. The earliest cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin,
introduced limited support for scripts to govern the handling
of transactions. Later platforms, notably Ethereum, provide
powerful support to users to embed complex application logic
into the ledger.
Various developers are using smart contracts to build sophis-
ticated solutions which address real-world solutions in a secure
and decentralized manner. These include applications such as
trading securities and derivatives [80], optimize supply chains
[81], remote healthcare [82], and prediction markets [83], etc.
Our credential verification solution uses a permissioned
blockchain, i.e. one where peers in the ecosystem are assigned
different roles and privileges. Smart contracts define the rules
according to which credentials may be revoked.
C. Ecosystem and Threat Model
The ecosystem for credential verification typically consist
of various parties as depicted in Fig. 1.
Universities award academic credentials in a field of study.
A credential in this context refers to a diploma, degree,
or certificate issued by a university to a student in lieu
of successful completion of the requirements of a certain
educational program. These credentials serve as proofs of
qualification, considered essential for most jobs and various
other life opportunities. Therefore, there is a considerable need
among employers and others to ensure that degrees belonging
to their workers are genuine.
Accreditation bodies are national-level or private entities
which undertake the task of verifying and validating academic
credentials issued by educational institutions. Certain accredi-
tation authorities also issue certified translations of credentials
or prepare equivalence certificates. In our setup, accreditation
bodies are also responsible for setting up and administering
the Cerberus network.
A final party to this scenario could be observers such as
citizen groups, activists, and watchdog bodies whose key role
is to audit the operations of these different parties and maintain
quality checks.
In our threat model, we assume that any of these entities
may be malicious. For instance, a student may try to forge a
credential or purchase one from a diploma mill. A university
may sell fake degrees. An accreditation body may try to
accredit fake degrees. Different malicious parties may even
collude. As we’ve noted in §.II-A, these threats are realistic
and there are abundant examples of each.
A credential verification solution should defend against the
aforementioned attacks to the greatest possible extent. Here
we list certain desirable security properties of such a system:
• Authenticity The system should serve as a secure and
authentic repository which enables verification of creden-
tials. All stakeholders should be able to view and audit
the inner workings of this system and maintain checks
on the behavior of other parties. Moreover, the system
should integrate with existing credential management
infrastructure.
• Resilience: In the ideal case, we should be able to detect
credential fraud if there is at least one honest party
participating on the blockchain network.
• Privacy Preservation: The system should not leak any
data regarding students’ credentials or personal infor-
mation to third parties (such as employers) beyond any
information the students may choose to reveal themselves.
This includes student identities, grade transcripts, degree
status, etc.
We also list here certain other features for a credential
verification system that are desirable from a usability and
efficiency perspective:
• Real-time Online Verification: A prominent property of
blockchain solutions is disintermediation, i.e. decoupling
the need for trusted centralized parties, and thereby
immensely speeding up operations. The credential ver-
ification process is typically cumbersome and involves
paperwork and communication with the awarding univer-
sity. However, an online verification solution operating on
top of a permissioned blockchain should enable real-time
degree verification for users.
• Third-party Verification: The system should enable
third parties to directly and independently verify creden-
tials of a user without relying on intermediaries.
• Selective Disclosure: Users should be able to verify
individual credential details in a piecemeal manner. This
would enable students to share selective details with
different parties. For instance, Alice could print her
primary credential details on her curriculum vitae and on
job applications, without revealing any other potentially
sensitive data, such as national identification number
or grades transcript. These could be disclosed in other
situations that necessitate it.
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• Usability: The system should be easy to use and not
require significant technical sophistication on the part of
users. Multiple studies also note that users face difficulty
storing and handling cryptographic credentials [84][85].
• Revocation: If a credential is revoked, the revocation in-
formation should be efficiently and quickly disseminated
to all stakeholders, without any room for ambiguity.
Credential verification solutions in certain countries are
already adopting many of these features. Centralized online
verification systems have recently been rolled out to combat
widespread credential fraud in India [86] and Malaysia [87].
In later sections, we discuss how popular technologies such
as smart phones and QR codes can be leveraged to further
facilitate user experience.
III. The Proposed System: Cerberus
In this section we describe the inner workings of our
proposed solution. We start with a high-level overview of the
key steps in the life cycle of a credential. The process is
depicted in Fig. 2.
An accreditation body operates and maintains a permis-
sioned blockchain network in partnership with multiple parties
including universities and observer entities, such as activist
organizations and citizen groups. The universities circulate
transactions containing validation information for credentials
they issue to students. The accreditation body periodically
collects these transactions and aggregates them into blocks
which are then added to the blockchain. Observer parties audit
every process in the system and maintain checks on integrity.
When a student, Alice, graduates, the university issues
her a physical certificate of her academic degree and her
transcript. The university administration also creates a trans-
action containing a digital fingerprint of Alice’s credential
details (alongside that of other graduating students). This
transaction is digitally signed by the university registrar and
propagated on the Cerberus network, where it is verified by
nodes belonging to the accreditation body, mined into a block
and added to the blockchain. This step corresponds to the
issuance and accreditation of a credential.
The physical degree certificate issued to Alice by the
university incorporates a QR code, for credential verifica-
tion, printed on the front which facilitates verification of the
information on her certificate. If an employer, Bob, wants to
check if Alice’s degree is genuine, he can scan the code with
a smartphone app or use a web portal. These services retrieve
validating information from the Cerberus network in real-time,
verify the code, and inform Bob of the degree’s authenticity.
Alice can also print the credential verification code on her
resume alongside her educational details so that any third party
can verify her degree independently of the physical certificate.
If the university were to revoke Alice’s degree, it would
circulate a revocation transaction which the accreditation
body would verify and add to the blockchain. Any party that
checks Alice’s credential verification code subsequently would
be informed that the degree has been revoked (as explained in
detail below).
In the detailed solution specification which follows we
also describe additional features whereby additional data may
selectively disclosed and authenticated using the blockchain
(such as Alice’s identity, the contents of her educational
transcript, etc.). Solution developers can easily adapt these
general techniques to different types of data as per their
requirements.
A. Administering the Network
The accreditation body is responsible for initial config-
uration of the network and to maintain the blockchain and
update the network as participants change over time. The
accreditation body has to deploy multiple nodes itself to dis-
tribute and secure the network. These nodes should ideally be
geographically spaced and secured as per industry standards.
The accreditation body also manages how other parties
access and use the network. When a new university is listed,
the accreditation body adds it to the network and certifies
it’s cryptographic keys. A university may also be removed
from the network for various reasons (e.g. in case of fraud
or if quality standards are not met) in which case it’s address
and keys are added to a blacklist. Keys that have been lost
or compromised are also added to the blacklist and new keys
are generated to replace them. The accreditation body also
provides access to third party observers to audit the network.
The accreditation body may also update the network as
per users’ requirements by introducing new contracts, roles,
and privileges to cater to evolving policies or changes in the
ecosystem.
B. Issuance of the Credential
When an academic session concludes, the university pre-
pares degree certificates for students in the graduating batch.
Issuing the credential comprises three key steps as follows:
a) Preparing the Credential: Our solution enables ver-
ification of two sets of data: the first is data pertaining to
the academic degree (denoted as degree_info), and second is
more detailed data relating to the identity of the student and
contents of her transcript (denoted as id/transcript_info). The
student can choose to disclose these data items selectively for
6verification. For instance, she can publicly circulate details of
her degree on her resume or her social media profile, whereas
transcript and detailed identity details may only be required
by some employers.
The first data set, degree_info, typically contains the fol-
lowing information:
• name of the Student
• serial number of the degree
• title of the degree/program
• year the degree is awarded
• name of the University
The second data set, id/transcript_info, consists of the
following data items:
• details of student’s identity document (such as drivers
license, citizen card, etc.). This can even be just a personal
identification number.
• course codes, Titles, and credit hours for the study
program
• grades earned by the student
• Grade Point Average and Cumulative Grade Point Aver-
age earned by the student
The items in both data sets are individually concatenated
and uniquely fingerprinted using a hash function, H(), forming
the student-info that constitutes a leaf. Popular hash functions,
such as SHA2 or MD5 may be used for this purpose. The
fingerprints are then input into a Merkle tree. Merkle trees,
first proposed by Ralph Merkle, are hash-based data structures
that allow authentication of data sets by computing a message
digest (or root) over the data items using hash-and-concatenate
operations to build a tree structure encompassing the entire
set [88]. This arrangement significantly reduces the amount
of verification data that needs to be put on the blockchain to
verify large data sets.
In our solution, the tree is composed as depicted in Fig. 3.
Each leaf node represents a student’s data, and the root of the
tree is computed over the entire graduating batch of students1.
This Merkle root, denoted the batch_Merkle_root, can now be
used to authenticate all data items in the original set, i.e. the
degree, identity, and transcript information for all students in
the batch.
b) Registering the Credential: The next step is to record
the batch_Merkle_root computed by the university, on to the
blockchain.
The registrar at the university creates a Cerberus trans-
action, addressed to the accreditation body, embeds the
batch_Merkle_root in the data field of the transaction, signs
the transaction with its private key, and circulates it on the
Cerberus network where it is received by every party. As
per the consensus rules, nodes belonging to the accreditation
body check incoming transactions for correctness, verify the
signatures, collect the transactions into a block and append it
to the blockchain.
As we noted earlier in §.II-A, university staff themselves
have been known to insert fake information into the student
1Merkle trees are binary, and therefore, if there are an odd number of
students, the last hash will be duplicated once to create an even number of
leaf nodes.
Figure 3: Preparing the Credential
Figure 4: Issuance of Physical Certificates: degree-code and
id/transcript-code
record. In our scheme, universities can institute further checks
against insider malfeasance by deploying schemes like multi-
signature wallets. This strategy requires the cooperation of
additional personnel in different departments within the uni-
versity to successfully create a valid transaction, for instance,
the examination departments for the students’ schools as well
as the university registrar.
The insertion of the transaction in the blockchain serves
as to accredit the student credentials with the accreditation
body.
c) Issuance of the Physical Certificates: The physical
certificates of the credentials and transcripts contain printed
QR codes, enabling users to validate the information using the
batch_Merkle_root on the blockchain.
Merkle trees have a useful property in that individual data
items in the original set over which the tree is computed
may be verified independently of the other data items if the
‘authentication path’ for the individual data items are available,
i.e. those sibling nodes in the tree that share the same parent,
on the path from the data item to the root. As an example,
in Fig. 3, Alice’s degree can be authenticated by hashing the
contents of the degree, concatenating a hash of her transcript
and identity documents, and then reconstructing the path up
to the root, using the sibling nodes 2 (shaded in Fig. 3), and
2For illustration purposes, the figure shows, a Merkle tree of height 4 and
the sibling hashes on the authentication path are also 4. The number of sibling
hashes on the authentication path, are always equal to the height of the Merkle
tree
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then verifying that the signature on the transaction belongs
to the university. All the information that a user requires to
undertake this process is embedded in the QR codes imprinted
on the degree certificate. We describe these next.
The first QR code, denoted degree_code, is used to verify
the contents of the degree certificate, and encodes the follow-
ing data:
• degree_info, i.e. text of student’s name, serial number of
the degree, title of degree/program, year of the award,
and name of the university
• H(id/transcript_info), i.e. a hash fingerprint of the data
pertaining to the student’s identity and transcript details,
which is also necessary to reconstruct the authentication
path for the degree_info
• the block-number and issuance-transaction-ID for the
transaction that validates the specific degree
• the complete authentication path for the particular degree
in the Merkle tree, i.e. all the sibling-hashes on the path
leading up to the tree root
The second QR code, denoted id/transcript_code, can be
used to verify the student’s identity and the contents of
her transcript, and encodes id/transcript_info, i.e. contents
of student’s identity document or identification number, and
complete contents of her transcript. This code can be printed
on the student’s degree or transcript as per requirements.
We consider QR code specifications in detail in §. IV.
Next we describe the verification process for students and
employers.
C. Verification of the Credential
The verification process for contents of the degree and of
the the identity and transcript data is very similar.
Contents of the degree are verified by scanning the de-
gree_code using a verification app, imprinted on the physical
copy of the degree or if embedded into a resume. The step-
wise verification process is depicted in Fig. 5.
First, the user’s app computes degree_info’ using the plain-
text degree contents information in the degree_code. de-
gree_info’ and id/transcript_info are then concatenated and
hashed. The result is then repeatedly concatenated with the
appropriate sibling nodes and hashed to reconstruct Merkle
tree, i.e. batch_Merkle_root’. The app then queries the Cer-
berus blockchain (using the block number and transaction
Contract Rules Engine
Inputs: An{}
Revoking Authority-List (An):
On receiving (A)
if ( E.address ∈ An{}):
An{} := A U An{}
else
A ∈ An{} , has x 2 public keys
Rules (A.address):
if ( A ∈ An{} & A has not previously revoked the same
document):
Revoke count := Revoke count ++
return (true)
else
Revoke count := Revoke count
An{} = Revoking Authority-List
A = Revoking Authority
E = any Entity in the Ecosystem
Figure 6: Rules Engine
ID in degree_code) and checks if batch_Merkle_root matches
batch_Merkle_root’ which it has computed. If the match is
positive, the contents of the degree are successfully verified.
Transcript contents are verified in a similar manner:
The id/transcript_code is scanned, and a id/tran-
script_info’ generated by the app by hashing the plain-
text transcript data in the code.Then the verifier manu-
ally enters the student’s identity document number. These
two items are concatenated and hashed to obtain a
H(id/transcript_info’). If this regenerated H(id/transcript_info’
matches the H(id/transcript_info) (used earlier when verifying
the contents of the degree) then the transcript content is also
verified.
D. Revoking a Credential
Now that we’ve discussed degree issuance and verification,
we are in a position to describe the revocation process. In
certain cases, universities or accreditation bodies may choose
to revoke degrees. Cerberus implements efficient on-chain
multiparty revocation using smart contracts. The revocation
process involves two smart contracts, the Rules Engine which
defines the precise rules according to which credentials may
be revoked, Figure 6 and the Implementation Engine, which
enforces these rules. These contracts are summarized in Fig. 7.
The addresses of these contracts are explicitly embedded in
the original transaction made by the university to register the
credential as described earlier.
a) Rules Engine:
• Only predefined nodes (belonging to the accreditation
body and/or university) can execute this contract and
participate in the revocation procedure. These nodes are
listed in an Authority-List.
8• Revocation must be approved by at least 2 nodes, in the
Authority-List.
• The university and the accreditation body each have two
pairs of keys. Revocation may be undertaken individually
by the university or the accreditation body, or by both.
• A node in the Authority-List can only sign the revocation
of a certificate once.
• Batch revocation is also possible in case the degree status
of an entire batch of students needs to be revoked (may
happened if the university fails to meet quality assurance
criteria or if any irregularities are discovered by the
university or accreditation body).
To revoke a credential, a node in the Authority-List initiates
the revocation procedure, by invoking the Implementation
Engine and providing the student_info’. In case of batch
revocation, (batch_Merkle_root) is provided.
b) Implementation Engine:
• This contract verifies that student_info’ matches one of
the existing certificates on the blockchain.
• The contract then verifies that the node is listed in the
Authority-List and issues a process-hash for the certifi-
cate, and increments a revocation counter.
• A second node in the Authority-List, using the process-
hash generated in the previous step, also invokes the
Implementation Engine.
• The Implementation Engine after verifying that the calling
node is listed in the Authority-List, increments the revoke
count again. It now stores student_info in a Revoke-List.
The verification process for the degree needs to be slightly
modified to check for revocation status. In this case, the user’s
smartphone app invokes the Implementation Engine present in
the transaction. This contract checks if student_info’ is listed
in the Revocation-list. If so, then it declares the credential as
revoked.
IV. Prototype
The Accreditation Body and University nodes were run on
desktop computers with the following specifications: CPU:
Intel Core i7-3517U @ 1.90 GHz, Physical Memory: 4 GB
DDR3 1600 MHz, OS: Ubuntu 13.04.e
The Students, Employers and Observers, can either use, a
desktop computers, a laptop or even a smart phone. For our
prototype we used one of each with the following specifica-
tions
• Desktop CPU: Intel Core i7-3517U @ 1.90 GHz, Phys-
ical Memory: 4 GB DDR3, OS: Ubuntu 13.04.e
• Laptop CPU: Intel Core i3-7100U @ 2.40 GHz, Physical
Memory: 8 GB DDR3, OS: Microsoft Windows 10 Pro
10.0.17134
• Smartphone CPU: 1.2GHz dual-core Qualcomm Snap-
dragon 410, Physical Memory: 1 GB , OS: Android 4.4.4
(KitKat); Sense UI, Main Camera: 8 MP
We implemented our protoype on Parity, an Ethereum
Client, Version 1.10.4-stable. Parity claims to be the fastest
and most advanced Ethereum client [89]. Parity supports a
Contract Implementation Engine
Inputs: DH , PH
r = Rules Engine (adressRulesEngine)
Revoke Document (DH ):
call r.Rules (A.address)
if (r.Rules (A.address)=true):
return (PH)
else
terminate process
Confirm Revocation (PH ):
call r.Rules (A.address)
if (r.Rules (A.address)=true & Revoke count = re-
quiredCount):
call Revoke List (DH)
else
terminate process
Revoke-List (DH ):
Revoke-List{} := DH U Revoke List{}
Output: ”PH”, Revoke-List
DH = Hash of Document PH = Process Hash required-
Count = revocation count required for successful revoca-
tion
Figure 7: Implementation Engine
private blockchain network configuration, through a Proof-
of-Authority consensus engine. Proof-of-Authority, a replace-
ment for Proof-of-Work, uses a set authorities - nodes that
are explicitly allowed to create new blocks and secure the
blockchain. The transactions to become permanent record
and included in the blockhain have to be signed off by the
predefined Authority List. This makes it easier to maintain a
private chain and keep the block issuers accountable. Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) is the runtime environment provided
by Ethereum for the efficient execution of smart-contracts.
Solidity Version 4.24, was used to code the smart contracts.
The data for all the students in a batch is input and converted
to a JSON format file. These JSON files, are input to the
Python program for data preparation. This program deploys
SHA256 where ever a hash function is required, such as
for fingerprinting the data, sibling hashes and merkle roots
computation etc.
The required data for each QR code is input into an open-
source QR code generator to create the QR codes to be printed
on the credentials. Also an open source QR code reader was
embedded into our Android app, and website interface.
A QR (Quick Response) Code consists of black modules
arranged in a square grid on a white background, that offer a
unique representation of data and can be read by an imaging
device. There are various types of QR codes available, distin-
guished by the total number of black modules and the number
of modules per unit area referred to as module density. The
earliest and smallest QR code called version 1 was a 21X21
grid, while each subsequent version increases by 4x4. Other
9distinguishing features include the level of error correction
level achieved (through redundancy of data), the size of the QR
Code, scanning distance, light and angle, and camera quality.
It can encode numeric, alphanumeric and byte data. [90]. Each
hash is 32 bytes long.
The amount of data in degree_code and id/transcript_code
(for a batch of 100 students) is estimated to be around
800 alphanumeric characters, for which Table I shows the
QR code specification and size. The equation for calculating
the minimum size of the QR code is as follows: Minimum
Size=(Scanning Distance/Distance Factor)x(Data Density/25)
[90]. For our calculation the Distance Factor =10 was as-
signed.
Students Merkle Tree Sibling degree_code Scanning QR Code
in batch Height Hashes Size Distance Size
(bytes) (bytes) (incheS)
50 6 192 bytes 406 bytes
2” 0.808”
4” 1.616”
100 7 224 bytes 438 bytes
2” 0.832”
4” 1.664”
200 8 256 bytes 470 bytes
2” 0.904”
4” 1.808”
500 9 288 bytes 502 bytes
2” 0.904”
4” 1.808”
1000 10 320 bytes 534 bytes
2” 0.936”
4” 1.872”
2000 11 352 bytes 566 bytes
2” 0.968”
4” 1.965”
4000 12 384 bytes 596 bytes
2” 0.968”
4” 1.965”
Table I: Batch Size & QR Code Specification
V. Discussion
In this section we discuss how our scheme counteracts
common types of credential fraud described earlier in §.II-A
and highlight its novel properties.
Cerberus safeguards Academic Credentials against modifi-
cation and manipulation, undue access, while making them
available to legitimate entities seeking to verify the existence
of a record, and surety that it has not been altered or been
revoked since. We separately reason how Cerberus prevents
the occurrence of each type of Credential Fraud as defined
previously in the II-A.
The permissioned blockchain architecture ensures strict
separation of roles and privileges among the participating
entities, preserves the integrity and chronological ordering of
the credential record, and enables stakeholders to efficiently
audit the operations of the system. If even one party on the
network is honest, it can detect suspicious behavior by other
entities and raise the alarm.
Counterfeit credentials and altered documents can easily be
detected using this system. A fake credential will not have
a corresponding record in the blockchain, whereas alterations
of an original document will result in a different credential
fingerprint which will not match the one on the blockchain.
However, our student, Alice, may bribe administrative staff
in the university to falsify a credential on her behalf. Cerberus
addresses this issue in two ways: first, due to the append-only
property of the blockchain, even universities and accreditation
bodies cannot insert backdated records into the ledger. Rewrit-
ing entire blocks to retroactively add data would require the
university to actively collude with the accreditation authority,
and this activity would be visible to all other parties on the
blockchain.
At best, Alice, can influence staff members to insert a
falsified record for her in the next upcoming batch on the
blockchain. This concern may also be mitigated if the uni-
versity were to define multi-signature policies for registering
credentials on the blockchain. In this case, for example,
creating a transaction would require the university registrar as
well as administrative staff in the relevant department within
the university to independently vet and sign the transaction.
Alice would therefore have to bribe multiple disassociated
parties to procure a fake credential, which will hopefully
require considerably more effort.
Likewise, this solution would address the problem of
diploma mills. Any new university wishing to join the network
would first have to be thoroughly vetted by the accreditation
body which would certify the university’s public key, thereby
allowing the university to make transactions. Non-approved
entities such as fake universities, by default, would not be
able to publish any data on the blockchain.
Combating fake accreditation agencies is more complex,
as a resourceful attacker might set up an entire blockchain
network himself to validate his fake credentials. In the context
of a single nationwide or regional accreditation service, there
should ideally be no confusion regarding which accreditation
body is legitimate. In areas where accreditation services are
privatized, the situation can perhaps be mitigated by requiring
accreditation bodies to include legitimating information on the
blockchain itself, such as a license to operate or a statement of
authorization from relevant government ministries or reputed
education watchdog bodies. The presence of reputed activist
and watchdog bodies which have joined the network as ob-
servers will add to the legitimacy of the accreditation body.
Cerberus has other fundamental advantages over legacy
credential verification solutions. First and foremost, the
blockchain is integrated into the credential issuance process
itself, thereby enabling accreditation-by-default in a sense.
The verification process consists of only a simple lookup on
the blockchain. This process dispenses with time-consuming
and cumbersome paperwork that is typical in existing sys-
tems and can be undertaken in real-time using computers
and smartphones. Students and employers can verify the
provenance and authenticity of credentials themselves and at
their convenience without relying on third parties or requiring
specialized technical skills or maintaining cryptographic keys.
Privacy of student data is maintained since no actual data
is put on the blockchain but only data fingerprints. These are
computed using one-way hash functions thereby disassociating
the process of validation of the data from the data itself.
No third party is therefore able to deduce students’ degree
details or information from the blockchain alone without also
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accessing the authentication path data that is printed on the
physical certificates. Cerberus enables the student to exercise
personal control over this data and share it with various parties
to undertake verification.
Selective disclosure is also facilitated in that the student
can share an individual data item (degree data or identification
data and transcript contents) and it’s authentication path with
a third party without having to reveal to them all the original
data items.
Cerberus also significantly improves on state-of-the-art
blockchain-based credential verification solutions proposed in
the literature. We discuss these next.
VI. Related Work
Legacy credential verification procedures typically rely
on university databases and unique codes (pin numbers and
hashing) and anti-counterfeiting technology to establish the
credibility of a document [93], [94], [95]. Some solutions asso-
ciate user profiles and education records with a single identity
[96] [97]. These systems have numerous weaknesses: there is
systematic redundancy, tedious paperwork, and cumbersome
processes, resulting in extensive effort, cost, and delays. There
is little standardization. Moreover loopholes for fraud and
crime persist, as documented in §. II-A.
It is widely acknowledged that the blockchain can play
a pivotal role in resolving many of these issues. Various
startups and companies now offer credential verification on
the blockchain, e.g. Appii [98], Gradba [99], Aversafe [52],
Verify [100], Accredible [101], TrueRec [102], and Bcdiploma
[103]. Efforts are also underway to build blockchain-backed
credential verification solutions at the national level in
Malaysia [104] and India [105].
Academic researchers have made significant contributions
in this domain and have proposed various new features and
optimizations. A pioneering effort in this regard was made by
the University of Nicosia (UNIC) in 2015, when it became
the first educational institution to issue academic certificates
(for its Digital Currencies course) on the Bitcoin blockchain
[106]. Since 2017, UNIC has issued all university diplomas on
the Bitcoin blockchain. Their solution is to issue the student a
digitally signed PDF file of the credential. The hash of this file
is inserted in the OP_RETURN field of a Bitcoin transaction.
Another prominent example is Blockcerts, an initiative
of the MIT Media Lab, which similarly inserted credential
verification information in the Bitcoin OP_RETURN field and
the Ethereum extraData field. Blockcerts also supported batch
issuance of credentials using Merkle trees.
Blockcerts had two key shortcomings: first, it required
students to maintain cryptographic keys, and, second, it main-
tained credential revocation lists on a centralized website
which could theoretically be compromised. To resolve the
second issue, researchers proposed Hypercerts, a distributed
and trustless credential revocation mechanism, which relies on
Ethereum smart contracts and the InterPlanetary File System
(IPFS), a decentralized data storage solution [107].
Solutions that followed contributed further to developing
scope, features, and application. For instance, EduCTX pro-
poses a unified global higher education credit and grading
system based on the European Credit Transfer and Accu-
mulation System (ECTS), in which coins are transferred on
the blockchain to signify academic study credits attained by
students [54]. This solution, built on the ARK platform, also
requires students to maintain cryptographic keys.
EchoLink stores user identities and academic credentials on-
chain via smart contracts for a range of blockchain platforms,
including Ethereum, AntShares, Metaverse, etc. [108] It’s goal
is to build a professional networking and recruiting platform,
providing easy access to a pool of vetted candidates. EchoLink
does not have a revocation mechanism.
UZHBC (University of ZuricH BlockChain) is a
blockchain-based verification system, specifically for diplomas
issued by the University of Zurich [109]. It uses the public
Ethereum blockchain and employs a smart contract for both
issuance and verification functions, and accepts a PDF of the
credential as input. Likewise, Blockchain for Education also
uses the public Ethereum blockchain and smart contracts for
access control and certificate management [53]. The Interplan-
etary Filesystem supplements this system by providing users
access to profile information of certification authorities.
These systems have various limitations: for instance, UNIC
and UZHBC are limited in scope to their parent institution and
EchoLink is only available to registered users. Most of these
solutions do not incorporate accreditation bodies (with the
notable exception of EduCTX and Blockchain for Education),
which leaves open the issue of university staff falsifying
records and the problem of diploma mills.
Most of these systems preserve privacy of student data.
EchoLink is the notable exception since it is recruiting plat-
form and offers viewing access to registered users.
The issue of scalability is only addressed by Blockcerts,
which offers a batch issuance mechanism. Other systems rely
on separate transactions per student which add to transaction
costs and contribute to blockchain-bloat when deployed on
public blockchains.
Moreover, the significant problem of certificate revocation,
is only satisfactorily addressed by two systems: Hypercerts
which relies on the InterPlanetary File System network, and by
Blockchain for Education which claims to use smart contracts
for revocation (implementation details are not provided).
In addition, many systems, notably Blockcerts, EchoLink
and EduCTX, require students and verifiers to maintain cryp-
tographic credentials or digital identities to participate in the
ecosystem and avail the verification service. This complicates
the user experience as has been documented in multiple studies
in the literature.
We compare key properties of these solutions with our work
in II. Cerberus makes significant new contributions: for one,
our solution adheres closely to the established ecosystem and
enables an extra layer of oversight by incorporating accred-
itation authorities and independent observer and watchdog
bodies. This is an effective check against documented real-
world problems such as that of corrupt university staff and the
phenomenon of diploma mills.
Cerberus relies on batch issuance and is therefore scalable
and can function as a university, consortium, or national-
level solution. Our revocation scheme is also unique in that
11
Scheme System Features Security Features Usability
Ac
cre
dit
ati
on
Ve
rifi
ca
tio
n
Re
vo
ca
tio
n
Co
un
ter
fei
tP
rot
ec
tio
n
Pr
iva
cy
Se
lec
tiv
e D
isc
los
ur
e
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
Us
erE
xp
eri
en
ce
No
Ke
yM
an
ag
em
en
t
Ac
ce
ssi
bil
ity
UNIC[106] - G# G#  -     
Blockcerts*[55] -  G# G#  -   -  
Hypercert[107] -  G# G#  -   -  
Echo†[108] - G# G# - -  G# - G#
UZHBC†[109] - G# G#  -     
EduCtx†[54]  G#   - G# G# - G#
Blockchain for
Education†[53]
  G#   -     
Cerberus           
 = provides property; G#= partially provides property; - = does not provide property
†= has academic publication; * = end-user tool available
Table II: Summary comparison of various solutions
it is on-chain and is a multi-party scheme, making it harder
to abuse. Cerberus also maintains privacy of user data and
offers students the novel facility of selective disclosure of their
verification information as per requirements.
A key advantage of Cerberus over prior solutions is in terms
of usability. Verification is an intuitive process which simply
requires scanning QR codes. Users do not have to maintain
digital identities or cryptographic credentials. QR codes are
easy and intuitive to use. Students can even distribute the codes
on their resumes and circulate them publicly if they choose,
enabling verification without the physical credential.
Finally, Cerberus is a private and permissioned system,
which, in contrast to public blockchains, enables more stream-
lined management and enforcement of policy and rules, and
the system can be upgraded to cater to the changing require-
ments of the ecosystem.
VII. Future Work
Here we describe possibilities for enhancing Cerberus and
adding new features.
One straightforward addition is to link multiple credentials
or qualifications undertaken by a student such that verifying
the most recent one ensures that all her previous credentials
are also genuine. This can be easily incorporated, by including
hashes of the earlier credentials in the transaction for her
recent credential. This would simplify the verification process
in cases multiple qualifications in the candidate’s history need
to be verified.
Second, Cerberus is a private network, and as an additional
integrity check, periodic snapshots of the Cerberus blockchain
can be anchored to a public blockchain, such as Bitcoin,
Ethereum etc. A convenient option for the snapshot would
be the hash of the latest block. This provides security against
malicious forks and history revision attacks if all parties in the
network collude and insert data retroactively in the blockchain
[117]. Blocks may only be considered part of the canonical
record if they build on top of the most recent block snapshots.
Furthermore, as blockchain-based solutions permeate man-
agement and governance structures (as has been predicted
[118]), we anticipate there will be solutions for various public
records (e.g. identity-information, health, education, driving
license, passport, criminal records, etc.). This may eventually
give rise to overarching records management systems, which
link multiple blockchains in the background as sidechains to a
main chain, enabling them to securely and efficiently exchange
information and present a unified and integrated platform.
A relevant example is IndiaChain, a high-level blockchain
platform with which other sidechains are expected to interface
[105]. Various sidechain protocols have been proposed to
date [110] [111] [112] include prominent projects such as
Rootstock [113] and Elements [114] that are sidechains linking
to the Bitcoin network. This architecture introduces modularity
in the system as well as obvious advantages of scalability and
interoperability. Whereas interoperability protocols are still at
a nascent stage in their development [115] [116], it would
be interesting to devise integration solutions for Cerberus in a
unified platform and investigate new features and opportunities
of such a step.
VIII. Conclusion
Credential fraud is a widespread and pervasive practice
that undermines confidence in educational institutions, impairs
social development, and involves significant economic costs.
Unfortunately, legacy credential verification systems are time-
consuming, costly, and cumbersome. Moreover, they are not
very effective against certain widespread corrupt practices,
including fraud on the part of educational institutions and
accreditation bodies.
In this paper we have proposed Cerberus, a comprehen-
sive blockchain-based solution which counters widespread in-
stances of fraud, as well as offers dramatic improvements over
legacy systems in terms of usability and efficiency. Cerberus
also offers distinct benefits over existing blockchain-based so-
lutions proposed in the literature and in industry. Our solution
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integrates effectively with the existing credential verification
ecosystem, it includes a novel on-chain credential revocation
mechanism, and does not require students or employers to
maintain cryptographic credentials.
We hope this work contributes positively to ongoing and
future efforts towards alleviating the phenomenon of credential
fraud.
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